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ORDERING CHAOS AT SEA: PREPARING FOR SOMALI PIRATE 
ATTACKS THROUGH PRAGMATIC INSURANCE POLICIES 
INTRODUCTION 
Abduwali Abdukhadir Muse, a young Somali man, made headlines in the 
United States in April 2009 when he and three co-conspirators held Captain 
Richard Phillips of the American-flagged Maersk Alabama hostage for nearly 
four days.1  Of four attackers, Muse is the only surviving pirate.2  The Navy 
brought Muse to the United States to stand trial.3  On May 19, 2009, a grand 
jury indicted Muse for conspiracy to violently seize a ship, conspiracy to hold 
a hostage, aiding and abetting a plot to hold a hostage, and unlawfully 
discharging a firearm.4  The United States has the legal authority to try 
individuals for piracy on the high seas.5 
The attack on the Maersk Alabama was the first Somali pirate attack to 
attract real media attention in the United States, possibly because compared to 
other shipping nations, the number of American-controlled ships that have 
been attacked by Somali pirates is relatively small.6  Arguably the most 
interesting aspect of the Maersk Alabama incident was that it was an anomaly 
among the modern piracy that occurs daily in the Gulf of Aden: The Navy 
intervened (rather daringly), and no one paid ransom.7  In many piracies in the 
area, insurers (and sometimes governments) negotiate with the pirates and pay 
 
 1. Robert D. McFadden & Scott Shane, Navy Rescues Captain, Killing Three Pirate 
Captors, Navy Kills 3 Pirates, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 13, 2009, at A1. 
 2. Benjamin Weiser, A Young Somali in Manhattan, To Face U.S. Charges of Piracy, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2009, at A1. 
 3. Id.  See United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea art. 100, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS]. 
 4. The charges were brought under 18 U.S.C. § 1651 (life sentence for piracy), § 2280 
(committing violence against a ship), § 924 (unlawfully discharging a firearm), and § 1203 
(hostage taking).  Indictment at 1–2, 4, 6–7, United States v. Muse, No. 09-cr-512 (S.D.N.Y. May 
19, 2009), available at http://www.investigativeproject.org/documents/case_docs/1160.pdf. 
 5. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (Congress may “punish Piracies and Felonies committed 
upon the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations.”). 
 6. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS ANNUAL 
REPORT: 1 JANUARY–31 DECEMBER 2009 16–17 (2010) [hereinafter ICC ANNUAL REPORT] 
(noting that in 2009, the United States had four ships attacked out of a total of 406 attacks). 
 7. McFadden & Shane, supra note 1. 
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ransoms.8  While it is expensive to pay ransom, it is cheaper than changing 
shipping routes.9  Insurers and shipping interests therefore seem willing to take 
the risk of encountering pirates for expediency’s sake, emboldening the pirates 
with a sense of success.  In 2009, 217 of the 406 reported pirate attacks 
worldwide were attributed to Somali pirates, compared with only 51 Somali-
attributed attacks in 2007.10 
Additionally, this is a new incarnation of piracy, an ancient crime, and 
marine insurance and domestic and international law have yet to evolve 
accordingly.  Traditionally, piracy was a violent attack on a ship aimed at 
procuring the vessel or the cargo onboard.11  Somali pirates have taken on a 
new strategy somewhere between terrorism (defined as violence undertaken for 
political ends12) and traditional piracy (violent armed robberies13).14 
Somali piracy has become an attractive career choice for young Somali 
men.  Twelve percent of the world’s daily oil supply moves through the Gulf 
of Aden.15  After years of war without a functioning central government, 
lawlessness is rampant.16  Piracy is now so lucrative that the bandits set up an 
investment exchange where people can invest in particular attacks without 
 
 8. See Alan Cowell, Pirates Attack Maersk Alabama Again, NYTIMES.COM (Nov. 18, 
2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/19/world/africa/19pirates.html?_r=1&emc=eta1 (noting 
that there were rumors of the Spanish government paying a $3.5 million ransom for the release of 
a Spanish crew); see also RAWLE O. KING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., OCEAN PIRACY AND ITS 
IMPACT ON INSURANCE 3 (2009) (noting that London based shipping firms are willing to pay 
ransom because their hull insurance policies cover piracy and will reimburse them). 
 9. James W. Carbin, Pirates: Hostis Humanis Generis, FED. LAW., Sept. 2009, at 50, 53. 
 10. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6, 21.  The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
notes that the Somali pirates were responsible for attacks in Somalia, the Gulf of Aden, the Red 
Sea, the Arabian Sea, the Indian Ocean, and Oman.  Id. at 21. 
 11. Phillip A. Buhler, New Struggle with and Old Menace: Towards a Revised Definition of 
Maritime Piracy, CURRENTS: INT’L. TRADE L.J., Winter 1999, at 61, 64. 
 12. Leticia M. Diaz & Barry Hart Dubner, An Examination of the Evolution of Crimes at Sea 
and the Emergence of the Many Legal Regimes in Their Wake, 34 N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 
521, 539–40 (2009). 
 13. Id. 
 14. One author argues that this new hijack-for-ransom strategy results from the pirates’ 
inability to maneuver large cargo vessels or to sell large amounts of stolen goods.  Carbin, supra 
note 9, at 55.  But see Somalia: Pirates Attack Oil Tanker, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2009, at A10 
(intimating that Somali pirates are becoming increasingly sophisticated, at least with regard to 
weaponry). 
 15. James Kraska & Brian Wilson, Piracy Repression, Partnering and the Law, 40 J. MAR. 
L. & COM. 43, 43 (2009). 
 16. Gwen Thompkins, Morning Edition: Battling Piracy Around the World: In Somalia, 
Piracy is an Attractive Career Option (NPR radio broadcast May 6, 2009), transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103815312&sc=emaf.  The Transitional 
Federal Government (TFG) of Somalia, elected in early 2009, consented to the United Nations 
recommendation that member nation ships freely traverse its territorial waters to police them.  See 
S.C. Res. 1816, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1816 (June 2, 2008). 
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directly participating in the violence, taking a percentage of the money earned 
if the attack is successful.17  International law is evolving to protect seafaring 
vessels and their crews, but these legal frameworks evolve slowly, and 
frequently are riddled with reservations by individual nations who wish to 
apply their domestic laws in lieu of certain compact provisions.18  The United 
States is cooperating with other nations to patrol the area and arrest pirates 
where possible.19  Additionally, the Maritime Safety Commission (Horn of 
Africa) (MSCHOA) established a recommended travel corridor that is 
patrolled continually by the participating nations.20  Despite these precautions, 
attacks have still occurred in the patrolled area.21  The Gulf is very large, and 
the pirates have been moving further and further offshore.22 
While the United Nations and its Member States work out the best way to 
control and punish pirates, insurers continue to pay ransoms.23  Insurers have 
passed these costs on to ship owners: premiums for voyages through the Gulf 
of Aden have increased tenfold since 2005.24  Logically, then, these increases 
are likely passed on to manufacturers in the form of increased shipping costs 
and general average expenses, and finally to the end purchasers of the cargo.  It 
is reasonable that the costs of this danger will be spread among those who 
undertake the risk.  However, insurers could accomplish this risk and cost 
spreading more efficiently with better tailored, more specific policies.  Though 
paying ransom undoubtedly perpetuates the cycle of piracy-for-ransom, there 
is an understandable serious concern for human life.  Insurers should pay these 
demands only in very specific instances to incentivize training and preventive 
measures, and marine insurance policies should be tailored to this end.  This 
would be a helpful stopgap while the international community learns to thwart 
the marauders effectively. 
This Comment will outline the international response thus far to the 
situation off the coast of Somalia.  After a brief history of marine insurance, 
exposing the complicated underlying policy and economic issues implicated in 
 
 17. Mohamed Ahmed, Somali Sea Gangs Lure Investors at Pirate Lair, REUTERS (Dec. 1, 
2009, 2:44 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE5B01Z920091201?rpc=60. 
 18. See Patrick J.S. Griggs, Uniformity of Maritime Law—An International Perspective, 73 
TUL. L. REV. 1551, 1562 (1999) (discussing difficulties in writing effective conventions in light 
of each individual country’s needs). 
 19. S.C. Res. 1846, ¶ 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1846 (Dec. 2, 2008). 
 20. Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=70&Itemid=58 (last visited June 20, 
2011). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Somalia: Pirates Attack Oil Tanker, supra note 14 (describing an attempt to attack an oil 
tanker approximately 1000 nautical miles from the Somali shore). 
 23. See Carbin, supra note 9, at 54. 
 24. Michael H. Passman, Interpreting Sea Piracy Clauses in Marine Insurance Contracts, 
40 J. MAR. L. & COM. 59, 59 (2009). 
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insuring modern voyages, this Comment will examine some other major crises 
that affected marine insurance and how insurers dealt with those situations.  
Finally, the author will recommend ways insurers (using the American system) 
can best protect their clients’—and their own—interests when contracting for 
voyages around the Horn of Africa. 
I.  THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE TO SOMALI PIRACY 
A. In General 
Though piracy has plagued the seas for millennia,25 incidents in the mid- to 
late-twentieth century were so rare that some United Nations delegates thought 
pirates no longer deserved the description hostis humani generis (the enemy of 
all).26  Even during this time, piracy still occurred to a lesser degree in 
Southeast Asia and some South American ports.27  Piracy in Somalia began in 
the early 1990s in the form of hostage-taking for ransom in Somali territorial 
waters,28 allegedly to protect the coastal waters from illegal dumping and 
overfishing that had devastated the local fisheries.29  The pirate activity in the 
area continued at low levels during the next fifteen years, but increased 
substantially in 2006.30  In 2009, there were 217 attempted attacks and 47 
successful attacks in Somali waters, the Gulf of Aden, the Red Sea, the Indian 
Ocean, the Arabian Sea, and Oman, all perpetuated by Somali pirates, resulting 
in 867 hostages taken in 2009.31  The resurgence has been attributed to the 
poor economy and lack of effective government in the country.32  Despite the 
danger, major shipping companies have continued to use the route from the 
Suez Canal to the Middle East: Approximately 50,000 ships and 12% of the 
world’s daily oil moves through this treacherous area.33  However, some 
companies, including Maersk and Odfjell, are considering altering their 
 
 25. Homer mentions pirates in the Iliad.  HOMER, THE ILIAD (H.F. Cary, A.M. ed., 
Alexander Pope trans., George Routledge and Sons 1872); see also Carbin, supra note 9, at 51. 
 26. Tullio Treves, Piracy, Law of the Sea, and Use of Force: Developments off the Coast of 
Somalia, 20 EUR. J. INT’L. L. 399, 399–400 (2009). 
 27.  See I.R. Hyslop, Contemporary Piracy, in PIRACY AT SEA 3, 16–18 (Eric Ellen ed., 
1989). 
 28. Per UNCLOS, a nation’s territorial waters extend up to twelve nautical miles from the 
coastline.  UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 3.  An additional twelve miles are considered contiguous 
zones, where states may patrol to enforce certain laws (immigration, customs, sanitation, and 
fiscal).  Id. art. 33.  Other nations may freely enter the twelve-mile contiguous zone, but not the 
twelve-mile territorial waters.  See id. arts. 25, 111.  Piracies committed in territorial waters are 
subject to domestic laws.  Id. art. 25. 
 29. Treves, supra note 26, at 400. 
 30. Id. at 399–400. 
 31. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 12–13, 25. 
 32. See Thompkins, supra note 16; Treves, supra note 26, at 400. 
 33. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 15, at 43. 
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shipping routes, possibly foregoing the Suez Canal for significantly longer 
trips around the Cape of Good Hope at a higher cost.34  One author noted: 
As the shipping industry confronts volatile fuel costs, plummeting freight rates, 
container ship surpluses and dramatically increased insurance premiums, 
protecting their ships, crew and cargo remains a paramount concern.  
Determining the most effective way forward, while challenging, has brought 
unprecedented partnering.  Industry representatives such as the Baltic and 
International Maritime Council (BIMCO) suggest that naval powers are 
responsible for keeping the sea lanes free, and maritime states should begin to 
work more closely to accomplish the counter-piracy mission.35 
B. United Nations and Other Public Bodies 
As noted above, under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea (UNCLOS), territorial waters extend twelve nautical miles from a 
sovereign state’s coastline.36  For any nation to prosecute individuals for 
piracy, the act of depredation must have occurred on the “high seas”—outside 
the territorial waters of any nation.37  In the early escalation of attacks, Somali 
pirates sometimes escaped capture by towing or running hijacked vessels into 
Somali territorial waters, evading international interveners and thus, 
prosecution under international law.38  United Nations Security Council 
Resolution 1816, approved June 2, 2008, allows certain states to enter Somali 
territorial waters to repress piracy or armed robbery at sea, using any method 
allowed under UNCLOS.39  This essentially eliminates the “high seas” hurdle 
to international prosecution for piracy offenses.  The Security Council has 
promulgated further resolutions, including Resolution 1851 on December 16, 
2008.40  In this resolution, the Security Council reaffirms its disapproval of the 
piracy; recognizes the sovereignty of the Somali Transitional Federal 
Government (TFG); encourages states to cooperate with the TFG in 
suppressing piracy; and encourages nations to prosecute pirates.41  
Additionally, this resolution notes that “lack of capacity, domestic legislation, 
and clarity about how to dispose of pirates after their capture, has hindered 
more robust international action against the pirates off the coast of Somalia and 
in some cases led to pirates being released without facing justice.”42  The 
resolution also “[n]otes with concern the findings . . . of the Monitoring Group 
 
 34. Id. at 46. 
 35. Id. 
 36. UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 3. 
 37. Id. arts. 100–01. 
 38. Treves, supra note 26, at 403–04. 
 39. S.C. Res. 1816, supra note 16, ¶ 7. 
 40. S.C. Res. 1851, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1851 (Dec. 16, 2008). 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
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on Somalia that escalating ransom payments are fuelling the growth of piracy 
in waters off the coast of Somalia.”43  The International Maritime Organization 
(IMO), a United Nations specialized agency focusing on international 
shipping, called a conference in Djibouti in January 2009, which resulted in a 
Code of Conduct to guide member states in coordinating efforts against the 
pirates, though their plans for implementation are still in the infant stage.44  
The IMO also published recommendations for ships’ masters in order to avoid 
piracy, encouraging evasive maneuvering, using long-range acoustic devices, 
and installing netting or electric fences.45 
In the United States, the National Security Council promulgated guidelines 
entitled “Countering Piracy Off the Horn of Africa: Partnership & Action 
Plan” in December 2008 to build upon the United States Piracy Policy 
President George W. Bush signed in mid-2007.46  This plan 
seeks to . . . establish and maintain a contact group; strengthen and encourage 
the use of the maritime security patrol area (MSPA) in the Gulf of Aden; 
support and contribute to a regionally based counter-piracy coordination 
center[;]47 disrupt and dismantle pirate bases ashore[;] and conclude 
agreements and arrangements to formalize custody and prosecution 
arrangement.48 
The United States Coast Guard announced additional precautions: All vessels 
sailing under United States flag through the Horn of Africa must have an 
approved anti-piracy security plan on file and must post guards on the ship.49  
In addition to requiring flagged ships to register anti-piracy plans, the 
Department of State has been investigating the possibility of arming ships or of 
allowing private security firms to escort ships.50 
 
 43. Id. ¶ 9. 
 44. Press Release, Int’l Mar. Org., High-Level Meeting in Djibouti Adopts a Code of 
Conduct to Repress Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships (Jan. 30, 2009), available 
at http://www.imo.org/Newsroom/mainframe.asp?topic_id=1773&doc_id=10933. 
 45. IMO, Guidance to Shipowners and Ship Operators, Shipmasters and Crews on 
Preventing and Suppressing Acts of Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, at 12, 
MSC.1/Circ. 1334 (June 23, 2009). 
 46. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 15, at 52; see also NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, COUNTERING 
PIRACY OFF THE HORN OF AFRICA: PARTNERSHIP & ACTION PLAN (2008); Press Release, 
Memorandum on the Maritime Security (Piracy) Policy (June 14, 2007), available at 
http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/06/20070614-3.html. 
 47. This parallels the ReCAAP, the agreement between Southeast Asian nations including 
heavy patrolling and monitoring that is credited for greatly reducing the number of piracy 
incidents in the Straits of Malacca, the most dangerous waterways in the world from the 1980s 
until the late 1990s.  See generally ZOU Keyuan, New Developments in the International Law of 
Piracy, 8 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 323 (2009). 
 48. Kraska & Wilson, supra note 15, at 52 (citing NAT’L SEC. COUNCIL, supra note 46). 
 49. Carbin, supra note 9, at 54. 
 50. Id. at 53–54. 
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Other international industry groups are also working to help ships avoid 
attack.  The MSCHOA established a heavily-patrolled Internationally 
Recommended Marine Corridor where all ships should travel.51  Additionally, 
the International Marine Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) maintains a 
live piracy report, posting details, photos, and coordinates of recent attacks and 
suspected pirate ships.52  The PRC links to international recommendations and 
highlights trouble spots worldwide, as well as encourages all ships to report 
any attempted attack immediately.53  The Philippines announced that in 2010, 
it would require all citizen sailors to complete an anti-piracy course; over 470 
Filipino sailors have been held hostage over the last five years.54 
C. The Need for Modernized Private Practices 
Despite the intergovernmental and nongovernmental actions outlined 
above, the number of attacks in 2009 (406) is substantially higher than the 
number of attacks during the same period in 2008 (293).55  Though the number 
of attacks for January through June 2010 is lower in the Gulf of Aden, the 
attacks have moved farther offshore.56  According to the PRC’s live piracy 
report on November 15, 2009, there were ten attempted attacks in the Gulf of 
Aden or off the coast of Somalia in the previous ten days, two of which 
resulted in hostage situations.57  Only eleven attacks were reported across the 
world during this time period.58  As of December 31, 2009, Somali pirates held 
approximately 263 crewmembers hostage.59 
As is clear from the persistence and increasing sophistication of attacks, 
the end, or even minimization, of piracy in Somalia is not yet in sight.  The 
area is geographically vast, and pirates use small craft.60  Private entities must 
coordinate as soon as possible: Waiting for an international compact or even 
 
 51. Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings, supra note 20. 
 52. See IMB Piracy Reporting Centre, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS., http://www.icc-
ccs.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=30&Itemid=12 (last visited June 20, 
2011). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Philippines Orders Sailors To Take Anti-Piracy Classes, BBC NEWS (Jan. 4, 2010, 
11:58 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8439198.stm. 
 55. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 25. 
 56. See ICC INT’L MAR. BUREAU, PIRACY AND ARMED ROBBERY AGAINST SHIPS: REPORT 
FOR THE PERIOD 1 JANUARY–30 JUNE 2010 5–6 (2010) [hereinafter ICC QUARTERLY REPORT] 
(showing a decrease in the amount of attacks in the Gulf of Aden and an increase in the attacks in 
other offshore areas, including the Red Sea). 
 57. Live Piracy Report, ICC COMMERCIAL CRIME SERVS. (citing data as reported Nov. 15, 
2009) (on file with author). 
 58. Id. 
 59. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 21. 
 60. See Cowell, supra note 8 (describing a pirate attack in which the pirates used a skiff 600 
miles off the coast of Somalia). 
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military suppression could take several more years at least, if the crackdown on 
piracy in the Straits of Malacca is indicative.61  Currently, just as there is no 
one-plan-fits-all solution for insuring a voyage, there is no set solution 
regarding who pays for what if a hostage situation arises.62  Insurers should 
incentivize preventive behaviors and clearly state when ransom will be covered 
and by whom. 
II.  HISTORY OF MARINE INSURANCE 
A. Marine Insurance in General63 
1. Development of Coverage 
Marine insurance has existed almost as long as humans have been using 
the waters to ship goods.  Research shows that ancient Chinese merchants split 
their cargoes between several vessels, thereby spreading the risk of loss among 
merchants.64  The Code of Hammurabi, dating from 2300 B.C., contained 
“bottomry” provisions.65  Under bottomry, if there was a mortgage on the ship, 
the owner would be indemnified in case of a total loss; if the ship arrived 
safely, however, the owner would pay over a substantial portion of his profits 
to the insurer.66  This practice was incorporated into Roman law as early as 50 
B.C.67  Justinian limited insurance rates on this “foenus nauticum” to 12% in 
A.D. 533.68  There is evidence that the Lombards and the Hanseatic League 
practiced a form of marine insurance in their shipping businesses in the 
thirteenth and fourteenth centuries.69  Codification and standardization began 
in the Middle Ages: The Barcelona Ordinance of 1435 standardized 
continental policies.70  The modern English policies evolved from the 
 
 61. The Straits of Malacca were formerly the most dangerous waterways in the world, but 
thanks to strong multinational cooperation in Southeast Asia, only two attacks occurred in 2009.  
ICC QUARTERLY REPORT, supra note 56, at 5. 
 62. Evidence of ransom payments is difficult to obtain.  See infra Part V. 
 63. For a more detailed history of the evolution of marine insurance, see generally VICTOR 
DOVER, A HANDBOOK TO MARINE INSURANCE: BEING A GUIDE TO THE HISTORY, LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF AN INTEGRAL PART OF COMMERCE, FOR THE BUSINESS MAN AND THE STUDENT 
(2d ed. 1924); D. McKellar, Marine Insurance—An Ancient Art that Meets Modern Demands, 16 
VICTORIA U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 161 (1986). 
 64. CHRISTOPHER HILL ET AL., INTRODUCTION TO P & I 1 (2d ed. 1996) (describing the 
ancient predecessors to the P & I Club). 
 65. D. McKellar, supra note 63, at 161. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. DOVER, supra note 63, at 16. 
 69. Id. at 19–21. 
 70. Id. at 22. 
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Ordinance of Florence, authored in 1523.71  This is the wording that the early 
English underwriters adopted.72  The Royal Exchange was founded in London 
in 1570,73 which became the main center for marine insurance brokerage in 
England after the powerful Hanseatic League was expelled from Great Britain 
in 1597.74 
2. The English System and Lloyd’s 
By the mid-1600s, English underwriting occurred mostly at coffee shops 
near ports.75  The most famous of these was Edward Lloyd’s shop, established 
in 1687.76  The Lloyd’s system began informally, with merchants writing their 
names under the description of a particular voyage as a sign of their agreement 
to indemnify a portion of the voyage in exchange for a premium.77  Parliament 
officially incorporated Lloyd’s in an 1871 act.78  Additionally, the company 
“oversees and regulates the competition for underwriting business . . . [and] 
has statutory powers . . . to regulate the affairs of the international insurance 
market in London” under the Lloyd’s Acts of 1871 and 1982.79 
The Lloyd’s system is unique and complex.  “Names,” individuals who 
pool their resources to underwrite marine risks, deposit funds with Lloyd’s.80  
This amount determines the amount of risk that a Name is allowed to 
underwrite.81  A member’s agent acts as a fiduciary for the Name, helping it to 
join a syndicate or underwriting agency.82  A Name normally underwrites in 40 
to 100 different syndicates.83  Agents of the syndicates maintain booths on the 
floor at Lloyd’s.84  Ship owners hire a certified Lloyd’s broker to represent 
their risks to the syndicates on the Lloyd’s floor.85  The broker presents a 
broker’s slip summarizing the risk to a particular syndicate.86  The first 
 
 71. D. McKellar, supra note 63, at 162. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. DOVER, supra note 63, at 21. 
 75. D. McKellar, supra note 63, at 162. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Jeremy A. Herschaft, Not Your Average Coffee Shop: Lloyd’s of London—A Twenty-
First-Century Primer on the History, Structure, and Future of the Backbone of Marine Insurance, 
29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 169, 174 (2005). 
 78. Lloyd’s Act, 1871, 34 Vict., c. 21 (Eng.). 
 79. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 174 (quoting Lipcon v. Underwriters at Lloyd’s London, 
148 F.3d 1285, 1288 (11th Cir. 1998)). 
 80. Id. at 175–76. 
 81. Id. at 176 
 82. Id. at 176. 
 83. Id. at 177. 
 84. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 177. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
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syndicate to sign on is the “lead underwriter.”87  Subsequent underwriters may 
adhere to the same terms, or request different ones if there is no “full-follow” 
clause requiring all underwriters to adhere to the same terms.88  Once 100% of 
the risk is allocated, the risk is considered insured, even before the final 
contract is drawn up.89  This complex system of risk-spreading underscores the 
difficulties inherent in insuring a major commercial venture. 
3. The Development of General Average and P & I Clubs 
General average is a concept that developed independently of, but parallel 
to, contractual marine insurance agreements.90  Historians estimate that this 
system originated between 900 and 700 B.C. and was incorporated in the law 
of Rhodes in A.D. 200: “Let that which has been jettisoned on behalf of all be 
restored by the contribution of all.”91  The York-Antwerp Rules, revised 
several times over, still govern the principles of general average.92  Rule A 
defines a “general average act” as one where “any extraordinary sacrifice or 
expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common 
safety for the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a 
common maritime adventure.”93  General average was traditionally linked to 
property or commerce, but courts have implied that an expenditure to save 
human life should qualify in some limited cases as a general average act, 
allowing contribution.94  General average is now instituted by clauses in bills 
of lading that incorporate the York-Antwerp Rules.95  Formerly, “substituted” 
expenses (expenses incurred to prevent the necessity of jettisoning cargo, for 
 
 87. Id. at 178. 
 88. Id. at 179. 
 89. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 178. 
 90. DOVER, supra note 63, at 17.  An “average” is a loss of some kind.  F.D. ROSE, 
GENERAL AVERAGE: LAW AND PRACTICE 2 (1997).  A particular average is one that is 
attributable to a particular party (e.g., the first mate for poor steering, the installer for a faulty 
part, etc.).  Id.  A general average, however, is a loss that is undertaken for the safety of the 
voyage.  Id.  Traditionally, this meant jettison of cargo (as in throwing cargo overboard to avoid 
sinking) or cutting down a ship’s mast to avoid imminent peril.   Id. 
 91. DOVER, supra note 63, at 17. 
 92. ROSE, supra note 90, at 2. 
 93. 2004 YORK-ANTWERP RULES, § A, ¶ 1 (emphasis added), available at http://www.co 
mitemaritime.org/Uploads/YAR%202004%20english.doc.  A very similar definition is found in 
the British Marine Insurance Act: “There is a general average act where any extraordinary 
sacrifice or expenditure is voluntarily and reasonably made or incurred in a time of peril for the 
purpose of preserving the property imperiled in the common adventure.”  Marine Insurance Act, 
1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 66(2) (Eng.) (discussed infra). 
 94. ROSE, supra note 90, at 15 (citing Montgomery & Co. v. Indem. Mut. Marine Ins. Co., 
[1902] 1 KB 734, 740). 
 95. Id. at 10. 
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example) could not be claimed through general average at common law.96  
York-Antwerp Rule F changed this exclusion, encouraging ships’ masters to 
take preventive action where appropriate.97  All parties that could potentially 
be required to contribute to general average expenses routinely procure 
insurance for such expenses.98  If general average is invoked, an independent 
adjuster calculates the proportional loss and contribution of each party, which 
sometimes takes years; then the parties must sort out disputes in arbitration and 
the courts.99 
Protection and indemnity clubs, now known as P & I Clubs, are essentially 
mutual assurance groups of insurers.100  Their predecessors date back to 
ancient China and India, as well as the medieval guilds.101  The hull club, the 
direct predecessor of the P & I Club, grew out of ship owners’ dissatisfaction 
with the available marine insurance: many of these clubs specialized in a 
particular risk that was considered too expensive or risky to be covered by 
normal marine insurance.102  These clubs also allowed the owners to insure 
voyages for more than the value of their vessel; they were normally limited to 
the ship’s appraised value by the Marine Insurance Act of 1745.103  If a 
collision or similar occurred, causing damage greater than the appraised value 
of the ship itself, the ship owner would have a resource for the additional 
liability from loss of cargo or personal injury.104  Today’s P & I Clubs function 
as corporations, funded by premiums and calls, where members vote to 
approve or deny claims.105 
B. The American System of Marine Insurance 
1. An English Example 
The American system of marine insurance is derived from the English 
example.  The earliest recorded instance of marine insurance originating in the 
United States dates to 1721, when a Mr. John Copson of Philadelphia 
advertised a marine underwriting operation at his home because American 
settlers had “been obliged to send to London for such Assurance, which has 
 
 96. Id. at 59. 
 97. Id. at 60 (citing 1994 YORK-ANTWERP RULES, § F). 
 98. WILLIAM TETLEY, INTERNATIONAL MARITIME AND ADMIRALTY LAW 391 (2002). 
 99. ROSE, supra note 90, at 12. 
 100. HILL ET AL., supra note 64, at 1. 
 101. Id. at 1–2. 
 102. Id. at 2–4. 
 103. Id. at 6. 
 104. Id. at 7. 
 105. HILL ET AL., supra note 64, at 9–10. 
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not only been tedious and troublesome, but even very precarious.”106  The first 
official company, the Insurance Company of North America, was established 
in 1792.107  One author estimates that by 1845, there were seventy-five or more 
American marine insurance companies.108  This growth in the field has “kept 
pace with the tremendous development of the resources of the world’s richest 
continent” since then.109 
2. Admiralty Law and the Common Law 
In the United States, federal courts have original jurisdiction over 
admiralty and maritime matters.110  The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal 
district courts jurisdiction over admiralty or maritime claims, whether they are 
private civil matters or criminal matters.111  The British Parliament passed the 
Marine Insurance Act, 1906, which codified the British common law of marine 
insurance.112  This statute was considered so well-written that it was “copied 
almost verbatim in most of the countries of the Commonwealth.”113  Similar 
statutes codifying marine laws exist in European countries, including France, 
Italy, Spain, and Germany.114  The European Union, South Africa, Australia, 
and China all have legislation in effect governing marine insurance.115  The 
United States is somewhat unique, then, among modern industrial nations in 
that marine insurance is not governed by federal statute, even though federal 
courts have jurisdiction over admiralty matters.116  Instead, United States 
courts rely on the general maritime law, an American version of the lex 
mercatoria as existed in civilian Europe.117  The 1906 English Act has been 
very persuasive in United States court decisions.118 
 
 106. LESLIE J. BUGLASS, MARINE INSURANCE CLAIMS: AMERICAN LAW AND PRACTICE 1 
(2d ed. 1972). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 111. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 76–77 (1789) (establishing the judicial courts of the 
United States). 
 112. Marine Insurance Act, 1906, 6 Edw. 7, c. 41, § 66(2) (Eng.); see also TETLEY, supra 
note 98, at 583. 
 113. TETLEY, supra note 98, at 583. 
 114. Id. at 584 & n.26. 
 115. Id. at 584, 587–88. 
 116. Id. at 585. 
 117. Id. 
 118. TETLEY, supra note 98, at 585–86. 
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3. The Wilburn Boat Doctrine 
The Wilburn brothers and their houseboat-turned-ferry caused an upheaval 
in marine insurance practice in the United States in 1955.  The brothers had 
been using their houseboat to transport commercial passengers across Lake 
Texoma when the boat was destroyed by fire.119  The brothers tried to recover, 
but their claim was denied because the boat was insured for personal use 
only.120  In Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co., the Supreme 
Court held that there was no federally-established admiralty rule governing 
marine insurance contracts, and therefore state insurance law should govern 
these contracts.121  This was contrary to prior Supreme Court and English 
admiralty decisions.122  Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result on the 
grounds that the matter of a small boat on an inland lake was local rather than 
national in character.123  This decision caused American law governing marine 
insurance to diverge somewhat from its English cousin,124 as well as to become 
a bit unpredictable for underwriters.125  One author observes that lower courts 
have avoided this undesirable rule by: 
[R]outine application of state law; appearing to find, without discussion, a 
well-developed admiralty rule in the American decisions; finding such a rule 
with the aid of English decisions; and finding that the state law does not differ 
substantially from the “maritime law” . . . and that the state has no substantial 
interest in the application of its law.  Finally, the court may simply ignore 
Wilburn.126 
4. The American Institute of Marine Underwriters 
The American Institute of Marine Underwriters (AIMU) attempts to help 
American underwriters navigate the complex system of risk allocation and 
United States case law by developing form contracts and lobbying on the 
industry’s behalf.127  Somali piracy is currently one of the hot issues that 
AIMU is tracking, hoping to help its members develop appropriate coverage 
 
 119. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310, 311 (1955). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 316, 321. 
 122. Graydon S. Staring, Admiralty and Maritime Law: Selected Topics, 26 TORT & INS. L.J. 
538, 543 (1991). 
 123. Wilburn, 348 U.S. at 321–22. 
 124. TETLEY, supra note 98, at 586. 
 125. Staring, supra note 122, at 545. 
 126. Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted). 
 127. AM. INST. OF MARINE UNDERWRITERS (AIMU), http://www.aimu.org/ (last visited June 
7, 2010). 
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for this new risk.128  The AIMU policies have become the new American 
standard for marine insurance contracts, as outlined below. 
III.  MODERN AMERICAN MARINE POLICIES: LANGUAGE AND COVERAGE 
Piracy is arguably as old as shipping by sea, mentioned in the Justinian 
Digest of A.D. 529,129 which also discussed marine insurance.130  The bandits 
were historically labeled hostis humanis generis (the enemy of all mankind) 
and Ishmaelites (persons without a country).131  Shippers have been insuring 
against the risk of pirates for almost as long as they have been insuring, 
developing a group of form clauses that can be pieced together to protect 
against various threats inherent in different voyages.132  Several approaches to 
allocating the risk of piracy have emerged through practice over the years, as 
outlined below.133 
A. Hull Policies and “Perils” Clauses 
The American Institute Hull Clauses include a standard “perils” clause: 
 Touching the Adventures and Perils which the Underwriters are contented to 
bear and take upon themselves, they are of the Seas, Men-of-War, Fire, 
Lightning, Earthquake, Enemies, Pirates, Rovers, Assailing Thieves, Jettisons, 
Letters of Mart and Counter-Mart, Surprisals, Takings at Sea, Arrests, 
Restraints and Detainments of all Kings, Princes and Peoples, of what nation, 
condition or quality soever, Barratry of the Master and Mariners and of all 
other like Perils, Losses and Misfortunes that have or shall come to the Hurt, 
Detriment or Damage of the Vessel, or any part thereof, excepting, however, 
such of the foregoing perils as may be excluded by provisions elsewhere in the 
Policy or by endorsement thereon.134 
 
 128. AIMU, AIMU ISSUES BOOK *1–2 (2009).  In addition, the group is tracking legislation 
relating to marine insurance and terrorism, a subject that may be highly relevant to protecting 
ships from Somali piracy.  Id. at *4–5. 
 129. ZOU, supra note 47, at 323. 
 130. DOVER, supra note 63, at 16. 
 131. Carbin, supra note 9, at 51. 
 132. Raymond P. Hayden & Sanford E. Balick, Marine Insurance: Varieties, Combinations, 
and Coverages, 66 TUL. L. REV. 311, 315 n.5 (1991) (“It is questionable whether any policy is so 
straightforward and without alteration as to be truly ‘typical.’  There are, for instance, several hull 
forms available in the marine market.  In practice, these policies become a patchwork of standard 
clauses drawn from various sources and customized to reflect the intentions of the parties to the 
particular contract.”) (citation omitted). 
 133. See generally Eric Danoff, Marine Insurance for Loss or Damage Caused by Terrorism 
or Political Violence, 16 U.S.F. MAR. L.J. 61, 62–73 (2003–2004) (providing an overview of 
marine insurance coverage terms). 
 134. AIMU, AMERICAN INSTITUTE HULL CLAUSES ll. 70–74 (1977), available at 
http://www.aimu.org/aimuforms/7.pdf. 
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This section appears to include the risks of piracy, and for many years was 
interpreted as such.135  However, this same form policy later excludes threats 
from piracy under the War Strikes and Related Exclusions Clause: 
The following conditions shall be paramount and shall supersede and 
nullify any contrary provisions of the Policy. 
This Policy does not cover any loss, damage or expense caused by, 
resulting from, or incurred as a consequence of: 
(a) Capture, seizure, arrest, restraint or detainment, or any attempt thereat; or 
(b) Any taking of the Vessel, by requisition or otherwise, whether in time of 
peace or war and whether lawful or otherwise; or 
(c) Any mine, bomb or torpedo not carried as cargo on board the Vessel; or 
(d) Any weapon of war employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or 
other like reaction or radioactive force or matter; or 
(e) Civil war, revolution, rebellion, insurrection, or civil strife arising 
therefrom, or piracy; or 
(f) Strikes, lockouts, political or labor disturbances, civil commotions, riots, 
martial law, military or usurped power; or 
(g) Malicious acts or vandalism, unless committed by the Master or Mariners 
and not excluded elsewhere under this War Strikes and Related Exclusions 
clause; or 
(h) Hostilities or warlike operations (whether there be a declaration of war or 
not) but this subparagraph (h) not to exclude collision or contact with 
aircraft, rockets or similar missiles, or with any fixed or floating object, or 
stranding, heavy weather, fire or explosion unless caused directly by a 
hostile act by or against a belligerent power which act is independent of 
the nature of the voyage or service which the Vessel concerned or, in the 
case of a collision, any other vessel involved therein, is performing.  As 
used herein, “power” includes any authority maintaining, naval, military or 
air forces in association with a power. 
 If war risks or other risks excluded by this clause are hereafter insured by 
endorsement on this Policy, such endorsement shall supersede the above 
conditions only to the extent that the terms of such endorsement are 
inconsistent therewith and only while such endorsement remains in force.136 
Clearly, this provision exempts from coverage the acts of piracy allegedly 
covered by the earlier perils clause.  Even if the form hull policy is not used, 
these above-mentioned risks are normally excluded through the use of the Free 
of Capture and Seizure Clause (F.C. & S.),137 which contains substantially 
similar language to the War Strikes and Related Exclusions Clause excerpted 
 
 135. Passman, supra note 24, at 60–61. 
 136. AIMU, supra note 134, ll. 239–55. 
 137. Danoff, supra note 133, at 63–64. 
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above, and also expressly exempts coverage of piracy.138  It is important to 
note that the general hull policy contains insurance for general average losses 
the policyholder might incur.139  These exempted risks are insurable, but ship 
owners must purchase a separate War Risks policy to obtain coverage.  This 
policy is essentially the opposite wording of the above, with some additions.  
The essential portion is the first clause, a basic statement of coverage: 
 This insurance is only against the risks of capture, seizure, destruction or 
damage by men-of-war, piracy, takings at sea, arrests, restraints, detainments 
and other warlike operations and acts of kings, princes and peoples in 
prosecution of hostilities or in the application of sanctions under international 
agreements, whether before or after declaration of war and whether by a 
belligerent or otherwise, including factions engaged in civil war, revolution, 
rebellion or insurrection, or civil strife arising therefrom; the imposition of 
martial law, military or usurped power, and including the risks of aerial 
bombardment, floating or stationary mines and stray or derelict torpedoes, and 
weapons of war employing atomic or nuclear fission and/or fusion or other 
reaction or radioactive force or matter but excluding loss, damage or expense 
arising out of the hostile use of any such weapon and warranted not to abandon 
(on any ground other than physical damage to ship or cargo) until after 
condemnation of the property insured.140 
Exempting war risks from general hull coverage makes sense in terms of 
allocating risk: Those vessels that are traveling a safer route, or who choose to 
take on the risk of piracy do not have to pay the additional premium for this 
coverage.  The costs of the acts of piracy are spread among those who choose 
to travel more perilous routes or who wish to have this added peace of mind. 
However, the costs of War Risks policies for the Gulf of Aden have 
increased tenfold since mid-2008.141  One recent attack was 1000 nautical 
miles off the coast of Somalia, a distance far greater than previous attacks.142  
Statistics gathered by the International Chamber of Commerce/International 
Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Center (PRC) indicate that attacks in the 
area during 2009 kept pace with those in 2008, and are spreading farther from 
the coast and northward into the Red Sea.143  Some ships traveling this distance 
 
 138. See AIMU, F.C. & S. CLAUSE (HULLS) (1959), available at http://www.aimu.org./aimu 
forms/87B-59.pdf. 
 139. For more discussion of General Average, see supra Part III.A.3.  It will be interesting to 
see if any cases arise where the victims of a pirate attack who do not carry a separate war risks 
policy would be able to file a claim for general average, or if the court would read this to be 
precluded by the War Strikes Clause. 
 140. AIMU, WAR RISK ONLY OPEN POLICY (CARGO) ¶ 1 (1981), available at 
http://www.aimu.org/formsmenunumber.html. 
 141. AIMU ISSUES BOOK, supra note 128, at 1–2. 
 142. Somalia: Pirates Attack Oil Tanker, supra note 14. 
 143. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 5–6, 21. 
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from the shoreline might have chosen to take the remote risk of a pirate attack 
and forego the high cost of a War Risks policy.  Alternatively, they might all 
purchase the policy because the premium is still cheaper than diverting 
shipments around the Cape of Good Hope.144  Arguably, then, the separation of 
liability for piracy is spread between the appropriate parties, but the costs to 
insurers may soon be too great to continue insuring these risky voyages. 
B. A Clear Definition of Piracy145 
Another layer in the already complex debate about how to solve the 
problems piracy poses for international shipping is settling on a definition of 
piracy.  Hull risks and general average were originally formulated to cover 
risks to vessel and cargo,146 and piracy involved acts of “robbery and 
depredation” on the high seas against that property.147  American statutes 
incorporate the UNCLOS definition, which includes any act of violence or 
depredation done on the high seas for personal gain against the crew of a 
ship.148  Alternatively, the International Maritime Bureau defines piracy as 
“[a]n act of boarding any vessel with the apparent intent to commit theft or any 
other crime and with the apparent intent or capability to use force in the 
furtherance of that act.”149  In the United States, case law indicates that 
“piracy” as defined in a marine insurance contract may consist of 
(1) an act of depredation (not limited to robbery), (2) by persons not 
recognized as belligerents by the political branches of the government or by 
foreign governments, (3) on the “high seas” (as that term is popularly used), 
(4) for private ends, and (5) in the spirit of general or universal aggression 
against all.150 
Though the term “piracy” has traditionally been broadly construed by 
marine insurers, covering a number of different types of attacks on a ship,151 
there is a risk of equivocation on the point if the term is not defined in the 
contract.  Somali pirates, unlike traditional pirates, do not wish to steal the 
cargo or the vessel: Instead, they threaten violence against human lives and 
costs in the form of ransom and delay of delivery of goods, essentially 
 
 144. See Carbin, supra note 9, at 53 (indicating that the easiest tactic to repel pirate attacks is 
to avoid that area of the sea, but that such a strategy has increased costs). 
 145. For an in-depth discussion of how the definition of piracy affects international law, see 
generally Buhler, supra note 11. 
 146. ROSE, supra note 90, at 5–6. 
 147. Buhler, supra note 11, at 63 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 72 (9th 
ed. 1783)). 
 148. 18 U.S.C. § 2280(a) (2006); UNCLOS, supra note 3, art. 101. 
 149. ICC ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 6, at 3. 
 150. Passman, supra note 24, at 84–85 (footnotes omitted). 
 151. Id. at 67–68. 
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extorting a toll to pass through their waters safely.152  Considering this new 
incarnation of crime at sea, defining the term in an insurance contract might 
provide better protection for insureds, as well as insurers—but it could also 
provide a technicality upon which an insurer could deny coverage.153  It is easy 
to imagine such a coverage dispute arising if insurers begin experiencing an 
even higher number of claims for hostage-for-ransom situations without 
defining “piracy” in their policies. 
C. Modern General Average and P & I Club Coverage 
As noted above, general average is usually insured against by all parties to 
a “common adventure.”154  The clause included in AIMU cargo and hull risks 
policies states: 
 General Average and Salvage shall be payable as provided in the contract of 
affreightment, or failing such provision or there be no contract of 
affreightment, payable at the Assured’s election either in accordance with 
York-Antwerp Rules 1950 or 1974 or with the Laws and Usages of the Port of 
New York.  Provided always that when an adjustment according to the laws 
and usages of the port of destination is properly demanded by the owners of 
the cargo, General Average shall be paid accordingly. 
. . . . 
 When the contributory value of the Vessel is greater than the Agreed Value 
herein, the liability of the Underwriters for General Average contribution 
(except in respect to amounts made good to the Vessel), or Salvage, shall not 
exceed that proportion of the total contribution due from the Vessel which the 
amount insured hereunder bears to the contributory value, and if, because of 
damage for which the Underwriters are liable as Particular Average, the value 
of the Vessel has been reduced for the purpose of contribution, the amount of 
such Particular Average damage recoverable under this Policy shall first be 
deducted from the amount insured hereunder, and the Underwriters shall then 
be liable only for the proportion which such net amount bears to the 
contributory value.155 
General average rules have not changed much, but their application that has 
changed over the years, with parties to common adventures insuring against 
general average losses.156  The lengthy determination of who is at fault and for 
how much, however, remains an administrative hurdle to sharing losses.157  
 
 152. Id. at 87–88. 
 153. Contra id. at 88 (arguing that defining such terms would help insurers price risk, 
benefitting both parties to an insurance contract). 
 154. See supra Part III.A.3. 
 155. AIMU, supra note 134, ll. 120–23, 128–33. 
 156. ROSE, supra note 90, at 8–9. 
 157. See id. at 12 (describing the role of an average adjuster). 
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Thus it seems insurers of general average expenses—who are also insurers of 
voyages—have an incentive to clearly define who will cover ransom expenses 
incurred in modern piracy incidents.  Otherwise, their total risk on a particular 
voyage remains unpredictable. 
P & I Clubs sometimes include a clause in their rules that allow the 
directors to pay a claim that may not be specifically covered elsewhere in their 
rules.158  For example, the American Club’s “omnibus” provision allows such 
discretion: “Liability for costs and expenses not expressly excluded elsewhere 
in these Rules, incidental to the business of owning, operating or managing 
ships which the Directors, in their sole discretion, shall consider to fall within 
the scope of the insurance protection afforded by the Association under these 
Rules.”159  These policies only cover those amounts which hull policies would 
not cover.160  Additionally, this policy only provides coverage for the war risks 
of piracy and barratry.161  Some P & I Club rules now expressly exclude 
coverage for terrorism.162  Even though piracy has always been a risk at sea, 
the new system of hijacking-for-ransom via small craft and a few heavily-
armed individuals is in some ways more akin to modern terrorism at sea than 
to traditional piracy.  One can imagine that P & I Clubs might eventually be 
forced to exclude coverage for ransoms due to the repeated high costs 
potentially incurred by members. 
D. Kidnap and Ransom Insurance 
There is some limited evidence that kidnap and ransom policies insuring 
the crew of a ship against such threats are taking hold.  The AIMU has not yet 
developed or endorsed such a policy, though some syndicates at Lloyd’s offer 
them.163  According to advertisements, the policy may include negotiation 
experts.164  Some companies now offer a “comprehensive package,” which 
sounds like a good idea in the face of complicated piecemeal policies covering 
every separate aspect of a major commercial sea voyage.165  Corporations have 
used similar policies to protect their employees that go abroad to dangerous 
 
 158. Danoff, supra note 133, at 71. 
 159. THE AMERICAN CLUB, 2011/2012 BY-LAWS, RULES & LIST OF CORRESPONDENTS 55 
(2011), available at http://www.american-club.com/rulebooks/1112.pdf. 
 160. Id. at 59–60. 
 161. Id. at 56. 
 162. Danoff, supra note 133, at 71. 
 163. Maritime Kidnap and Ransom Insurance Growing, INT’L EXEC. SEC. MONITOR (Oct. 7, 
2009), http://kidnapandransom.net/2009/10/maritime-kidnap-and-ransom-insurance-growing/. 
 164. Unique & Related Coverages: Kidnap and Ransom Insurance, MERCATOR RISK SERVS., 
INC., http://www.mercatorpro.com/products/unique_amp_related_coverages/kidnap_and_ransom 
_insurance.html (last visited June 20, 2011). 
 165. See, e.g., SCR and MUSC Launch Vessel Shield to Solve Piracy Coverage Dilemma, INS. 
SERVS. NETWORK (Mar. 4, 2009), http://www.isn-inc.com/news/news.aspx?nid=1084&cid=4. 
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regions for work.166  Undisputedly, paying ransoms legitimizes the actions of 
the pirates.167  Encouraging the purchase of such coverage would, extended ad 
absurdum, lead to consumers paying lawless individuals for the privilege of 
buying goods which passed through international waters, making ransom part 
of the cost of doing business.  This would certainly conflict with the stated 
goals of the United Nations Security Council—and hopefully meet with 
widespread public protestation.  However, some payments may not be 
avoidable at this early stage of the fight against Somali pirates. 
IV.  THE ETHICAL DILEMMA OF PAYING RANSOMS 
It is very difficult to obtain accurate data on ransom payments, possibly 
because some ship owners may not be reporting payments if they have the cash 
resources to allow them to deal off the grid.  Hostage situations create 
significant concern for American-flagged ships, as their crews and cargoes are 
in imminent danger.168  Those who pay ransoms now do so in direct 
contravention of the wishes of the United Nations Security Council, of which 
the United States is a permanent member.169 
One attorney posits several propositions about ransom payments, but fails 
to cite the sources for his numbers or theories.  James W. Carbin states that in 
September 2009 the total amount paid in ransom for hostages held by Somali 
pirates was projected to reach $50 million soon.170  The anecdotal reports of 
individual, per-craft payments show ransoms are normally in the single-digit 
millions of dollars.171  Carbin suggests that ransoms are being paid in two 
ways: by voluntary contribution of the parties to a voyage or by advancement 
of funds by particular interests who then invoke general average.172  Carbin 
argues that, in the first case, the insurance policy which covers the risk of 
piracy (in United States policies, the War Risks policy) voluntarily contributes 
to the ransom, as does, potentially, P & I Clubs and Hijack and Ransom 
insurance.173  In the second instance, a general average adjuster would be 
appointed after the doctrine is invoked to discern the values of each party’s 
 
 166. See Nicholas Schmidle, The Hostage Business, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Dec. 6, 2009, at 44. 
 167. A market for kidnapping oil workers is still thriving in Nigeria, allegedly due partially to 
the lucrative nature of payments from insurance companies.  Id. 
 168. The United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act only bans payments to foreign 
government officials or other parties who negotiate business with said foreign governments.  
Carbin, supra note 9, at 55 (discussing 15 U.S.C. § 78(dd) (2006)).  Thus, paying ransom to the 
pirates does not run afoul of this provision.  Id. 
 169. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 40, ¶ 9. 
 170. Carbin, supra note 9, at 54. 
 171. Id. at 55. 
 172. Id. at 54. 
 173. Id.  Carbin also notes here that it is not yet certain whether the P & I and hijack and 
ransom insurers will seek subrogation from the other insurers of the adventure.  Id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
2011] ORDERING CHAOS AT SEA 685 
interest in the venture.174  This value, interestingly, does not include a 
valuation of the lives of the crew, assessing only property values.175  It seems 
smart general average insurers will soon find a way around funding ransom, 
which is a substitute expenditure.176  Though Carbin argues that United States 
courts have approved the use of general average funds to pay ransom by 
positively citing a British case in an 1894 decision (Ralli v. Troop, 157 U.S. 
386 (1894)),177 it seems unlikely (or at least unwise) that a court would 
condone paying ransoms not explicitly provided for in the policy, contrary to 
the express U.S. public policy condemning such payments. 
V.  LEARNING FROM THE PAST: MARINE INDUSTRY RESPONSES TO PREVIOUS 
CATASTROPHIC DISTURBANCES 
A. The Exxon-Valdez and Changes at Lloyd’s 
As shipping is one of the world’s oldest industries, the insurance markets 
have experience responding to major disturbances in the market that appear 
from time to time throughout the centuries.  One example is the major 
structural change undertaken by Lloyd’s in the aftermath of the Exxon-Valdez 
incident.178  This loss, along with several others in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, forced the stately insurer to post major losses averaging $461,000 per 
member. 179  These losses, along with the fact that members were continually 
exposed to potentially unlimited personal liability in the future, led to a mass 
exodus of members.180  Lloyd’s quickly changed its rules, allowing 
corporations to become members for the first time; since directors and 
shareholders in corporations are protected against unlimited personal liability 
by the very nature of the corporate entity, this change eliminated the 
unattractive exposure to personal liability that formerly accompanied 
membership at Lloyd’s.181  Over the years, corporate membership increased, 
and individual membership decreased.182  There are now several types of 
 
 174. See ROSE, supra note 90, at 12 (describing the role of an average adjuster in determining 
claims). 
 175. Carbin, supra note 9, at 54. 
 176. Substitute expenditures are those that are used to avoid potential damage or delay to the 
ship, and traditionally were not covered by general average without prior approval.  This was 
altered by York-Antwerp Rule F.  ROSE, supra note 90, at 59–60; see also 1994 YORK-ANTWERP 
RULES, § F. 
 177. Carbin, supra note 9, at 55. 
 178. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 183. 
 179. Id. 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.  Individual members are still subject to unlimited personal liability in the event of a 
loss. 
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corporate memberships, making membership an attractive investment 
opportunity for a variety of types of companies.183  This fundamental change in 
who absorbs the losses adds another layer of protection for investors and 
insurers. 
B. New Form Clauses Specific to Certain Geographic Locations 
Prior to aggressive cooperation efforts between Southeast Asian 
governments, the waterways around Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines were pirate-riddled.184  Though the incidents in the Gulf of Aden 
now far outnumber the attacks in these areas, the International Maritime 
Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre still warns of a strong potential for attack.185  
Attacks on docked ships are still relatively common in the Philippines, as well 
as throughout South America.186  In response to these recurring problems, the 
AIMU promulgated a Philippine Shipment Clause and a South American 
Shipment Clause, insuring the cargoes of ships for a period of time once the 
ship has arrived at its destination port but the voyage has technically ended.187  
However, these clauses do not provide additional protection for crew members 
who may be faced with these sudden attacks, usually at night, while docked.188  
This may be because in those areas, the pirates are primarily trying to rob the 
ship rather than extort money from the ship owners by ransoming the crew.  
The very fact that the organization was willing to promulgate site-specific form 
clauses evinces a need and a desire to specifically tailor coverage for 
individual routes beyond the normal patchwork of general coverage shippers 
obtain, allowing the shipper to account for additional risks and the insurer to 
pass those costs of loss directly to those who take the risk of sailing that area.  
Formulating a similar “Gulf of Aden” clause could be one option for reforming 
the current approach to covering incidents in that area, as will be discussed in 
further detail below. 
 
 183. Herschaft, supra note 77, at 183. 
 184. ZOU, supra note 47, at 338, 343. 
 185. Piracy Prone Areas and Warnings, supra note 20. 
 186. Id.   Buhler, supra note 11, at 61 (noting a rash of attacks on Brazilian ports in the late 
1990s). 
 187. AIMU, PHILIPPINE SHIPMENT CLAUSE, available at http://www.aimu.org/aimuforms/ 
SP-18.pdf; AIMU, SOUTH AMERICAN SHIPMENT CLAUSE, available at http://www.aimu.org/ 
aimuforms/SP-10A.pdf. 
 188. See, e.g., Buhler, supra note 11, at 61 (describing a midnight attack where the crew of a 
vessel was held at knifepoint and gunpoint for money). 
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C. Reinsurance and Terrorism 
Marine reinsurance, the practice of insurers procuring indemnity insurance 
from larger insurers, is likely as old as marine insurance itself.189  The first 
recorded policy may have been written for a portion of an ancient trip from 
Genoa to Sluys: The insurer retained the Mediterranean risk, but resinsured the 
dangerous part of the route from Cadiz to Sluys.190  This further spreads the 
risks of loss among players in the industry.  Reinsurers normally cover both 
marine and non-marine policies, are lightly regulated, and depend on familiar 
principles to function (utmost good faith, stringent disclosure rules, and similar 
warranties as in marine policies).191  Reinsurance of Gulf of Aden voyages is 
likely already happening, but no formal statistics are available regarding what 
routes or dollar proportion of policies insurers are reinsuring.  One author 
points out that when insurers are considering changes to policy language, they 
must consider whether those changes will coalesce with reinsurance practices 
since the insurers often depend on the reinsurers for particularly risky 
ventures.192  Thus, when considering a comprehensive solution to insuring 
ships in the Gulf of Aden, insurers must be mindful of their supporters in 
reinsurance. 
Marine terrorist attacks have been on the radar since the Achilles Lauro 
incident in the early 1980s.193  Terrorism, like piracy, is a term of art in marine 
insurance, defined as a politically motivated act of violence against a ship.194  
In light of this definition, the hybrid nature of Somali piracy becomes clear: 
while the Somalis’ actions are not politically motivated per se, they are acts of 
violence directed against the people of the ship in order to extort money rather 
than the traditional seizure of goods.195  Like modern piracy, acts of terrorism 
are excluded from the AIMU Hull Policy, and there is continuing controversy 
about how to cover such acts.196  The 2001 terrorist attacks in New York 
caused a massive number of claims against numerous lines of insurance 
(property-casualty, business interruption, life, health, etc.).197  The “shocking 
 
 189. GRAYDON S. STARING, LAW OF REINSURANCE 6 (2011). 
 190. Id. 
 191. Graydon S. Staring, Insurance and Reinsurance of Marine Interests in the New Age of 
Terrorism, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1371, 1376 (2003). 
 192. Id. at 1377. 
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overboard in his wheelchair shocked the international community.  See Malvina Halberstam, 
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 197. Staring, supra note 191, at 1377. 
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amounts of loss and their unforeseeability . . . led many to doubt the market’s 
capacity for unlimited risks of terrorism in the future.”198  This doubt led 
insurers to refuse or limit coverage of the risk of terrorism, which the General 
Accounting Office found had a chilling effect on development and 
construction projects that need such coverage to obtain financing.199 
In order to reassure these insurers and businesses, the federal government 
passed a stopgap measure, the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act, to strengthen the 
market.200  In effect, the act (which was renewed through 2014) is set up like a 
reinsurance program: in the event of a catastrophic terrorist incident where 
losses exceed $100 million,201 the Secretary of the Treasury, with concurrence 
from the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, can activate the 
coverage, and direct insurers can recover from the government or from another 
reinsurer (not both).202  In exchange, insurers must cover damage caused by 
terrorist attacks, and offer coverage for such acts similar to other coverage 
available at the particular premium rate.203  Hence, businesses and insurers are 
urged to continue in their normal productive patterns without worrying about 
potential catastrophic losses from something so unpredictable as terrorism. 
VI.  AN INSURER’S APPROACH TO FIGHTING SOMALI PIRACY 
A. Revising the Applicable Clauses 
1. Defining and Redefining Piracy 
There are several steps insurers could take to revise marine policy clauses 
to make coverage clearer without losing the convenience of the form contract.  
Since each venture poses a unique set of risks, it is important from a practical 
standpoint that insurers are able to cobble together coverage by picking and 
choosing from existing language.  First, piracy should be redefined in 
 
 198. Id. at 1378. 
 199. Id. at 1378–79. 
 200. Terrorism and Risk Insurance Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-297, 116 Stat. 2322 
(codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)); see also Staring, supra note 191, at 1395.  The measure 
was initially set to expire in 2005, but was renewed by Congress through 2014 in 2007.  
Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-160, § 3(a), 121 
Stat. 1839, 1839 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 6701 (Supp. 2008)). 
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 102(1)(B)(ii), 116 Stat. at 2324 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
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Terrorism Risk Insurance Program Reauthorization Act of 2007 § 4, 121 Stat. at 1840 (codified at 
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 202. Terrorism Risk Insurance Act of 2002 § 103, 116 Stat. at 2327–332 (codified at 15 
U.S.C. § 6701 (2006)).  Insurers must also increase all subscribers’ premiums by 3% to attempt to 
recover some of the money if claimed.  Id. § 103(e)(8), 116 Stat. at 2330–231. 
 203. Id. 
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international law to include hostile acts against the ship or her crew for the 
purpose of extorting money, not just hostile acts against the ship to procure the 
goods onboard.  Much like denials of coverage that began after the terrorist 
attacks of 9/11,204 it is not unimaginable that insurers might change their 
broader conception of “piracy” to match the narrower one embodied in United 
States law if they must continually reimburse for Somali pirate attacks.  If the 
definition is consistent throughout law and business, denying coverage on such 
a technicality becomes much more difficult.  Additionally, defining “piracy” in 
the policy would help ship owners determine whether or not a particular 
incident is covered under that portion of the policy. 
2. The “Gulf of Aden” Clause 
In addition, or alternatively, insurers may want to consider a “Gulf of 
Aden” clause, passing the costs on to those who desire to use the convenient 
waterway despite the additional risks (and costs) of doing so.  This clause 
could be formulated to provide special coverage for kidnappings in this area.  
Though paying ransoms is controversial as it undoubtedly rewards the bad acts 
of the pirates, 205 the reality is that someone is paying.206  Creating a separate 
clause for this type of coverage would be a good way to efficiently distribute 
costs of this risk: Once shippers feel the area is politically stable and risks of 
kidnapping are minimal, they no longer will pay for the coverage.  This gives 
governments and international actors time to solve the problem, and also gives 
the marine insurance industry an easy way to revert to standard practices once 
the problem is under control. 
Additionally, offering such a clause will avoid the confusion and delay of 
determining who will pay how much and when, as happens when general 
average is invoked.  The pay now, figure it out later strategy, due to its 
complexity, should be saved for true one-off instances: The risks of travelling 
the Gulf of Aden are now infamous.  Further, insurers will no longer have to 
perform slight-of-hand to pay ransoms while still appearing to be in 
compliance with United Nations Security Council mandates.  Kidnapping and 
Ransom insurers often contract negotiations with the criminals out to a third 
party in order to maintain clean hands; the same could be done here.  But 
insurers would no longer have to pretend that they would not cover these losses 
that devastate their lifeblood industry. 
 
 204. See infra Part VII.B. 
 205. See Schmidle, supra note 166. 
 206. See Andrés Cala & Alan Cowell, After 6 Weeks, Somali Pirates Free Crew of Spanish 
Vessel, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2009, at A10. 
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B. Temporary Program of Government Reinsurance 
As previously mentioned, portions of the Terrorist Risk Insurance Act 
were extended in 2007 through December 2014.207  This act covers marine 
insurance policies, but only on the “terrorism” front, which still requires that 
the violent action be politically (rather than financially) motivated.208  The 
United States would likely be reluctant to sponsor coverage for ransoms, 
considering the United Nations Security Council condemns paying ransoms.209  
There is likely a loophole way that costs could be covered while not condoning 
or reimbursing for ransom expenses directly.  Perhaps some sort of 
consequential damages fund could be established to help pay claims resulting 
from the delays in transit.  This would offer reassurance to P & I Clubs who 
might be considering dropping coverage, and also keep seafaring vessels 
moving through the quickest route for trade.  The insurance industry and 
shippers, however, would likely benefit more from upfront definition of what 
is and is not covered, and offering the option of a Gulf of Aden clause to 
parties choosing to travel the dangerous route. 
C. Worst-Case Scenario: To Pay or Not to Pay? 
Paying ransom should be considered the last resort in a worst-case 
scenario, even when the theoretical “Gulf of Aden” clause is purchased.  There 
is certainly moral grey area here.  In fact, there is ample anecdotal evidence 
that paying ransoms in this type of situation does perpetuate the crimes.210  
However, the constant threat to human life makes paying ransoms difficult to 
resist.211  Insurers should require certain behaviors or procedures as 
antecedents to negotiating with pirates to incentivize preparation and 
competence among their clients. 
Insurers ought to require ship management to take anti-piracy courses.212  
This is similar to giving people a discount on their automobile insurance 
 
 207. See supra note 201 and accompanying text. 
 208. 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (2006). 
 209. S.C. Res. 1851, supra note 40, ¶ 9. 
 210. Kidnapping in Nigeria was similarly big business.  The kidnappers are accustomed to 
negotiating with certain crisis management groups insurers employ.  See Schmidle, supra note 
166. 
 211. After being held hostage for a month, and Spanish sailors pleading with their families to 
beg the government to give the pirates what they wanted, the ship was eventually freed.  See 
Cowell, supra note 8 (explaining that the Spanish prime minister, José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero, 
declined to comment on reports that a ransom of nearly $3.5 million had been paid for the 
Alakrana and its crew.  “The government did what it had to do,” he said). 
 212. The Philippines recently mandated that all of its citizens who sail on commercial ships 
take an anti-piracy course before being allowed to sail in 2010 because 470 of its citizens have 
been held for ransom in the past several years.  See Philippines Orders Sailors To Take Anti-
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premium for taking a driver’s education course: The risks of insuring such 
people are theoretically lessened if they have the skills to help protect 
themselves and their vehicle.  So too with sailors and their ship.  The IMO’s 
“Recommendations to Shipowners” recommends training sailors to use fire 
hoses, fences, or sonic devices to repel pirates at the first attempt to board.213  
Even prior to employing those deterrent measures, they recommend employing 
evasive maneuvering and reporting all attempted attacks to the International 
Maritime Bureau’s Piracy Reporting Centre.214  In addition to merely training 
the sailors in these measures, ship captains should be required to show that 
they employed these techniques and followed their anti-piracy plan in order to 
avoid capture in every way possible.215 
Additionally, ships should be required to show that they were travelling in 
the MSCHOA Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor where coalition 
forces patrol.  This area has still been the site of attacks, but the risks should be 
diminished if ships stay within this patrolled area.  Travelling within this 
corridor, as well as following IMO’s recommended procedures, should be 
requirements for covering ransom. 
CONCLUSION 
Piracy and insurance against piracy are nearly as old as shipping.  The 
Somali pirates have managed to turn the industry on its head by employing 
new techniques: combining hostage-for-ransom with attacking ships passing 
by.  Initially unsophisticated, the pirates are growing bolder, employing mother 
ships and creating an investment exchange.  Yes, paying ransoms validates 
their bad behavior, but as the Spanish Prime Minister said, sometimes you do 
what you have to do. 
Since this is a new incarnation of an old crime, no one is quite sure where 
or how it is covered in the hodgepodge marine insurance policies that cover 
individual voyages.  The insurers largely seem to be crossing their fingers and 
sending their clients on their way, hoping for the best.  Anticipating the worst, 
however, would be far more beneficial than scrambling when a ship is 
attacked.  Including a definition of piracy, and potentially a Gulf of Aden 
clause, could aid both sides (and courts) in the event of a disagreement.  Such 
language could help determine who is to pay what, when.  In addition, though 
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 215. Some have argued that we should arm the ships, issuing temporary Letters of Marque 
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the United States cannot condone paying ransom, 216 some sort of temporary 
government fund could help alleviate the high cost of insuring against such 
attacks, keeping sea traffic moving through the shortest travel routes.  Finally, 
before paying any ransom claim, insureds should have to prove that they were 
following IMO recommendations and travelling in the MSCHOA corridor. 
The United Nations, its member states, Somalia’s neighbors, and the 
transitional government of Somalia are working diligently to police the area 
and develop a long-term solution.  However, this takes time and 
experimentation.  In the meantime, insurers can assist by requiring training, 
preparation, and strategy of their clients—and of themselves. 
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